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A Physcialist Theory of Managing 
Impediments to Democracy and Peace 
Building in the Balkans 
But here you need something to move you and turn you in a new direction… Once 
you have been turned round, you must stay turned round. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value (Wittgenstein, 1980: 53e)
Preliminary Considerations
When it comes to seeing eye to eye about democracy, democracy is, more 
or less, seen through the eye of the beholder as theorist, which means that not 
all theorists of democracy see it in the same way. For the aggregative theorist 
(Przeworski, 2010), to see eye to eye is to have arrived at a legitimized out-
come by way of voting, whereas the agonist theorist (Mouffe, 2009; 2013) 
finds seeing eye to eye to be inherently difficult because of the conflictual, 
antagonist nature of human relations and of human plurality. It is little won-
der, then, that some within the agonist group believe that the best democratic 
politics can do is to transform the enemies of antagonism into the adversaries 
of agonism (Mouffe. 2009: 102-103). And, last but not least, there is the delib-
erative theorist (Gutmann and Thompson, 1997; 2004), who views democracy 
as the outcome of the internal deliberative process of critical reasoning and 
engagement with an eye to resolving conflict and creating collective decisions. 
Despite these different theoretical foci, the likes of voting, alterity, deliberative 
engagement, and consensus building remain points of contact between these 
theories of democracy, which find their partial expression in well-ordered and 
decent societies.1 
As we know, however, some societies are not so well ordered and decent. 
There are, for example, post-conflict societies within which democracy is to be 
built and within which a sustainable peace is to be achieved. Not surprisingly, 
such societies present a variety of challenges to the theorist and the practition-
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1 The theoretical landscape becomes even more robust when supranational democracy theory 
is added to the mix. See Cafaro, 2017. 
Rory Conces 7
er of democracy and peace. Take, for instance, Bosnia and Kosovo. Although 
each Bosnian and Kosovan possesses a multitude of identities – a plurality 
of selves – many of them select their endorsed ethno-nationalist identity as 
their dominant or most salient public identity. In fact, the salience of the eth-
no-nationalist identity has become so widespread among individuals that it 
reverberates within entire ethnic groups leading to “in-group” hypersolidarity 
and “out-group” distrust, and the formation of ethnic enclaves. These enclaves 
dampen interaction and integration between the various ethnic communities, 
preserving “fields of battle” instead of creating “fields of existence” (Conc-
es, 2011: 10). Even though the social distance between people who have the 
same ethno-nationalist identity is often reduced, allowing for enhanced soli-
darity (trust and cooperation) within that group, the same cannot be said when 
those with competing ethno-nationalist identities arrive on the scene. In fact, 
a “war of solidarities” often erupts within an ethnic enclave as those differ-
ing ethno-nationalist identities take precedence over other important identities 
(e.g., class, religious, and sexual), as well as the more general, if not universal, 
identity of person. Consequently, the tolerance that moves people closer to 
intergroup solidarity is much in demand when building a viable democracy, let 
alone for the much broader initiative of building a sustainable peace. 
Of the three groups of theorists, it is the work of the deliberative theorist that 
resonates the most with this emphasis on “interaction” and “integration” because 
it is through communicating with others in close quarters through conversation, 
dialogue, and, ultimately, deliberative engagement that divisive identities and 
toxic relationships can be deconstructed and then reconstructed to eradicate the 
enclave, thereby promoting democracy and peace. The premium placed on prox-
imal interaction and integration is especially true for peace building because its 
realization includes changing conflictual relationships through reconciliation, a 
process that incorporates both empathy, compassion, and forgiveness (Conces, 
2009: 22). It may even involve resilience, the capacity to recover from adversity. 
Admittedly, it is difficult to imagine such change within a situation short on in-
teraction and integration, where fraternity is difficult to come by. 
Unsurprisingly, these post-conflict situations are often sustained, even 
worsened, by the presence of a specific type of physical object, the evocative 
object, and in particular, the type that cognitively, affectively, and conatively 
resonates along ethno-nationalist lines.2 By provoking various ideas and emo-
2 I employ the standard meaning of the cognitive (understanding), the affective (emotion), and 
the conative (action) throughout this work knowing full well that the conceptual and empirical 
landscape within psychology is nothing but vast and complicated. I also use the term ‘idea’, 
referring to mental representational images or abstract concepts, though ‘belief’ (a disposition 
in the Quinean sense) and ‘attitude’ (possessing cognitive, affective, and conative compo-
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tions – perhaps images of past military engagements and their associative emo-
tions of joy or anger conjoined in the form of “affective-cognitive structures” 
(Izard, 1991: 15) – such objects attract some people and repel others depending 
upon their ethno-nationalist identity, thereby contributing to the creation and 
maintenance of ethnic enclaves. So a social project charged with preventing or 
breaking down these enclaves through social mobility needs to occur before 
the work of democratic theorists can be fully exploited. Dealing with ethnic 
enclaves, however, is foremost a physical project, since it involves the rear-
rangement and/or displacement of powerful evocative objects like flags, mu-
rals, and monuments. It is by changing the physical landscape understood as 
“the background against which choices are made [i.e., choice architecture]” 
(Sunstein, 2014: 14) that the movement and resettlement of peoples is made 
more likely, resulting in less divisive and more encompassing or transcendent 
identities and relationships,3 thereby generating the conditions of trust impor-
tant for the creation and maintenance of a democratic and peaceful society. 
Initially this project will be plagued with difficulties and much backsliding. 
In the long run, however, this project will move us closer to something like a 
meaningful and efficacious “we.” 
This mechanism of ridding neighborhoods of these objects sounds simple, 
yet it is anything but that. To put it bluntly: it leads us to the horns of a dilem-
ma. One horn is for elected officials, for example, to legislate these provocative 
objects swiftly out of existence but at the cost of violating constitutional and 
human rights law. In such messy situations, the judiciary and legislative bodies 
would be at loggerheads over these interventions, resulting in constant turmoil 
within civil society. The other horn is to follow constitutional and human rights 
law but at the cost of taking the much slower route of mass education and de-
bate, as well as attrition. The cost may be enormous since these objects would 
continue to spread their deleterious effects for years to come. Unfortunately, 
this dilemma is especially troublesome for the post-conflict societies of Bosnia 
and Kosovo because the continued abrogation of the law and the continued ex-
istence of these provocative objects are unacceptable and incomplete solutions 
to the problem of enclaves, respectively. 
How, then, are we to proceed? I believe there is a path between the horns 
that can supplement the slow approach to enclave collapse. It is provided 
nents) may be better suited at times. By an emotion I mean that which is “experienced as a 
feeling that motivates, organizes, and guides perception, thought, and action” (Izard, 1991: 3). 
3 I agree with Cass R. Sunstein that choice architecture is at work when a person enters a café 
or a market. But I also take such architecture to influence whether one enters this café or that 
café and this market or that market simply because the neighborhood to which the café or the 
market belong is inundated with flags, graffiti, or other evocative objects that attract some 
people and repel others. 
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by civic design,4 the design of cities and towns, and the interstices of urban 
centers – the rural and the edgelands – with the ultimate “goal of creating 
persons who are more inclined to work toward civic improvement” (Conces, 
2013a: 12). Civic design attempts to create a built environment that brings peo-
ple together within “empty space” and beside shared objects, “crowding out” 
boundary markers and warning signs of provocation, and promoting proximal 
interaction and integration between people, thus quickening the demise of the 
ethnic enclave. At a minimum, civic design under the auspices of NGO’s, ad-
vocacy groups (including architects and urban planners), and local government 
officials create the possibility for all to dwell here or there, to feel at home in 
places and through spaces that were once deemed off limits. As a result, the 
market and the hair salon are truly open for business, and the neighborhood 
park and walking street are truly available for strolling. While the nudge that 
civic design provides democracy and peace building will be modest, it will be 
real, and, thus, worthwhile. 
Like the dilemma’s horns, the path between will result in ethnically homog-
enous neighborhoods being hollowed out and sanitized of that which made 
them attractive and livable for some in the first place. A gentrification of a sort, 
the flags and murals that make the ethno-nationalist brand visible to bystand-
ers in the neighborhood – signaling whose turf it is – would be stripped away 
(though some of those objects would fill-in other spaces and at other places). 
However, it is hoped that the path between promotes rather than sacrifices 
more extensive livability across ethnic boundaries. The idea is something like 
this: if people feel more at ease in navigating the other’s neighborhood, then 
this might allow for opportunities of mutual well-being stemming from shared 
experiences at places like the market, the hair salon, and the café. Sharing of 
experiences may not only allow for some degree of bonding and bridging,5 but 
they may also allow them to directly deal with conflictual relationships (wheth-
er it be with the past in general or with people in particular). This constructive 
interaction may also occur in a “space of constructive provocativity”, a place 
like a studio – maybe even more like a laboratory (less about control and more 
about exploration) – in which the distinction between artist and non-artist be-
comes blurred and in which hotly contested issues are approached with the 
help of the aesthetic eye. Although some “cultural erasing” is unavoidable, the 
4 ‘Civic design’ is a process that takes urban planning and design (Krieger, 2009) into new 
areas. Robert Geddes (2013: 56-58) uses the term ‘civil architecture’ to refer to architecture 
whose goal is civil improvement. 
5 I rely here on Putnam (2007: 143) in distinguishing between bonding (tying “people who are 
like you in some important way”) and bridging (tying “people who are unlike you in some 
important way”).
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overall goal of the non-legislative approaches is to create a diverse community 
that respects uniqueness and difference without the hegemony that often comes 
with the forging of a “we”.6 To be sure, I am opposed to coercive heterogeneity 
(and tolerance as an end-state). 
This essay offers a physicalist theory of managing impediments to democ-
racy and peace building, beginning with four hypotheses, followed by an ab-
straction and mathematization in the form of a matrix, a dilemma arising from 
these hypotheses, and possible solutions. 
Hypothesis One (H1): Deliberative Engagement  
and Democratic Theory
H1: Deliberative engagement as a process involving the use of critical 
thinking and engagement with others in order to resolve conflict, problem 
solve, and create collective decisions is an important element of democracy 
insofar as democracy is about getting things done in a certain way. 
Whether theorists stress the legitimacy of collective decision-making 
through voting, pushing the deliberative process into the background; accentu-
ating the difficulty of consensus building within democracy, making it seem al-
most impossible at times; or emphasizing the deliberative process, pushing the 
voting procedure onto the horizon, they all recognize the internality (thinking 
as an internal activity) and the externality (dialogical activity) of deliberative 
engagement in democracy. They are all well aware that engagement is a means 
by which people change their minds and lives in meaningful ways. 
Deliberation involves critical thinking, with the construction and assess-
ment of reasoned argument as its core activity. In deliberation, the social theo-
rist Amitai Etzioni (2001: 151) writes, we “assemble and dispassionately dis-
cuss the facts of the situation, explore their logical implications, examine the 
alternative responses that might be undertaken, and choose the one that is the 
6 The “cultural erasing” I have in mind is neither an outright destruction of a people’s cultural 
heritage nor a re-grasping of history, though I understand how it can be both. The first face of 
cultural erasing is illustrated by the systematic attempt to destroy the religious and cultural 
heritage of Bosnia during the 1990s war. The diversity and coexistence among the different 
peoples of Bosnia’s was to be deleted from the landscape of the country. In addition to over 
a thousand mosques and churches that were destroyed, the National Library (Vijećnica) and 
the Oriental Institute in Sarajevo and the sixteenth-century Old Bridge (Stari Most) in Mostar 
were targeted and destroyed. Present-day examples of this erasing include the destruction 
of the Buddha statues at Bamiyan, Afghanistan; archaeological sites in Nimrud, Iraq and 
Palmyra, Syria; and Muslim shrines in Timbuktu, Mali. The second face is exemplified by ef-
forts to eliminate representations of racism and slavery on university campuses by removing 
monuments (Cape Town) and plaques (Oxford), and by renaming buildings (Yale). There is 
also the controversy surrounding the Confederate battle flag. 
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most appropriate as determined on the basis of empirical evidence and logical 
conclusions”.7 What we have here is more or less a reflection of the com-
petitive or adversarial form of argumentation in which there is advocacy, cri-
tique, and refutation of various positions. However, deliberation also includes 
a cooperative form of argumentation, one that is transformative inasmuch as 
it promotes interdependence and the building of deliberative communities 
(Makau and Marty, 2001: 83-107; 2013: 69-70). But whether we emphasize 
the competitive or the cooperative form does not detract from the fact that as 
a cognitive process, deliberation occurs internally, within the heads of people. 
The deliberation over interests, views, and positions, however, is not only 
with oneself, but is an engagement with others. This is its externality, exhibit-
ed in to-and-fro dialogical communication between people who acknowledge 
“a mutual commitment to hear and be heard” (Makau and Marty, 2001: 175). 
There is an “uptake and engagement – other people must hear or read, internal-
ize and respond – for that public-sphere activity to count as remotely delibera-
tive” (Goodin, 2003: 178). 
Additionally, engaged deliberation between many minds is important for 
democracy because the viability of democracy depends on “citizens’ reason-
ing beyond their narrow self-interest and considering what can be justified 
to people who reasonably disagree with them” (Gutmann and Thompson, 
1996: 2). Moreover, it is “through the give-and-take of argument, [that] citi-
zens and their accountable representatives can learn from one another, come 
to recognize their individual and collective mistakes, and develop new views 
and policies that are more widely justifiable” (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996: 
43). No wonder, then, that deliberative engagement entails a certain degree of 
non-partisanship, an attitude that works against a person naturally taking a par-
ticular side in a conflict from the very start (Conces, 2016: 69).8 This attitude 
encourages an openness to drawing in possibilities, rather than crowding out 
possibilities because of partisan bias or prejudice. Little surprise that people 
change their minds through cooperative argumentation, which fosters inclusiv-
ity and collective decision-making: “we depend on each other’s perspectives to 
generate meaning and a comprehensive understanding…. [Consequently, we] 
view those who disagree with us as resources rather than as rivals” (Makau 
and Marty, 2001: 88). 
There are, of course, critics of deliberative and participatory democracy, 
who have written less about democracy than its “deliberateness,” and they 
have not been reticent in their criticism. A glimpse into this criticism can 
7 I also include commonplace self-restraints on reasoning (i.e., intellectual virtues, epistemic 
goods, and one’s background beliefs and values) (Conces, 2009: 24). 
8 Incidentally, that work also distinguishes impartiality from non-partisanship. 
Dijalog12
be found, for example, in Jason Brennan’s provocative Against Democracy 
(2016). His catalog of criticisms is wide ranging, but I believe what is relevant 
to this essay can be reduced to the following. It begins with accepting the “edu-
cation thesis” as a core principle of these democracies: it is through a reasoned 
engagement with others about civic and political affairs that citizens become 
better informed in order to promote the common good. For sure, all citizens, 
including those who rely on evidence-based arguments and who are more or 
less non-partisan, use reasoning in their engagement with others. As the argu-
ment goes, however, reasoning is all about crafting winning arguments, argu-
ments that are self-serving and that have little to do with a pursuit of the truth 
(Brennan, 2016: 54-55, 38). Brennan (2016: 37, 61-62) claims matters are far 
worse because we all tend to deviate from rational thought, deviations like the 
well-known confirmation, disconfirmation, and intergroup biases. So what ac-
tually occurs in democratic deliberation falls far short of the benefits suggested 
by the education thesis. Brennan refers to a body of empirical studies that 
corroborates the shortcomings of political deliberation. Studies indicate, for 
example, that in some situations deliberation undermines cooperation among 
groups (Mendelberg, 2002: 156), tends to move people toward extremist po-
sitions (Sunstein, 2002), and leads people to question whether there is a cor-
rect position (Ryfe, 2005: 54). In addition, Brennan (2016: 68) reminds us 
of the phenomenon of “epistemic delinquency,” that is, people do not always 
revise their beliefs (or at least weaken their confidence in them) when faced 
with overwhelming contrary evidence. This point is well-taken. As someone 
who has taught undergraduates for twenty-five years, I can personally attest 
that people often do not state reasons, let alone good reasons, for their claims, 
and are often swayed by who said what and how they said it, rather than by 
the substance of what was said. Gullibility and complacency have taken on 
new meaning, especially in the era of “fake news.” It is no wonder that Bren-
nan (2016: 20) concludes that “deliberation tends to stultify and corrupt us; it 
makes us worse, not better”. That is hardly the sort of deliberative engagement 
promoted in this essay, however. 
Although I find Against Democracy to be an acknowledgment of the uphill 
struggle we face in the act of deliberation, it is a fact that deliberation often 
leads us to something better. Whether we realize it at any given moment, many 
of us do take seriously the regulative ideals of understanding, intelligibility, 
trustworthiness, credibility, and knowledge. Intellectual virtues like humility 
(vs. arrogance), empathy (vs. narrow-mindedness), integrity (vs. hypocrisy), 
perseverance (vs. laziness), and autonomy (vs. conformity) are important for 
many of us as well. And let’s not forget that many of us still care about truth it-
self, which becomes clear when faced with the nonsense of “alternative facts”. 
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It should now be obvious that aside from those defined by youth or infir-
mity, we are all positioned along the continuum of how strictly we hold to 
these commonplace self-restraints (including the ideals and virtues above) on 
belief construction and maintenance. Perhaps we fluctuate depending on the 
situation, moving back and forth along the continuum between two polar op-
posites: the regulated and virtuous critical thinker extraordinaire and the one 
who tosses aside the commonplace self-restraints on reasoning, leading to, for 
example, the self-righteousness, intolerance, over certainty, and zealousness of 
the fanatic. One can well imagine that a conservative Republican might come 
off as fanatical when talking politics with a bunch of Democrats, but as more 
rigorous in his thinking when responding to a group of moderate Republicans. 
In any case, deliberation occurs and we get results. We can only try to do it 
better by being more mindful of the self-restraints on reasoning and the value 
that resides in non-partisanship. 
The externality of deliberative engagement, however, is not just about the 
number of heads within which it occurs and not just about it being in the pub-
lic eye. For sure, new technologies and social platforms can help with all that. 
But it is also about how engagement takes on new meaning by becoming more 
personal. It is when externality is not just about the public dissemination and 
reception of communications, but includes the “crowding of all others” into 
close proximity with one another, that it will have a powerful impact on identi-
ties and relationships of real people (Šavija-Valha and Šahić, 2015), sometimes 
holding those who want to manipulate and control the crowd in check. The 
anti-Semite demagogue, for example, may count on the following insight to 
promote bad behavior towards Jews: “If some prominent person declares that 
Judaism equals Zionism equals racism, … the negative effect is likely to be 
all the greater among people who know no Jews, … regardless of how good 
their basic intentions might be” (Niebuhr, 2008: xx). As long as non-Jews are 
separated from Jews, it will be easier for the demagogue to manipulate the for-
mer against the latter. Manipulation need not occur, however. When non-Jew 
and Jew coalesce and dwell in close proximity with one another, they become 
neighbors, and as such they gain some immunity against the demagogue’s she-
nanigans because they will be in an epistemic position to know better. In the 
end, then, we should agree with the philosopher Ian Angus (2000: 130): “Re-
lations of immediate reciprocity such that each can speak and listen in turn, 
combined with access to relevant social knowledge [due to close proximity], 
ideally [my italics] guarantees that deliberation and decision-making cannot be 
monopolized by powerful interests.”9 
9 In truth, we must find whatever tool that helps us to keep the demagogue or spin doctor at 
bay. David N. DeVries’s (2016) distinction between “thinking through” and “thinking” offers 
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What this shows is that the value of deliberative engagement far exceeds 
what democratic theorists have traditionally given it.10 Deliberative engage-
ment is part of the much larger undertaking of peace building that is particular-
ly important for the post-conflict societies in Bosnia and Kosovo. Among other 
things, this sort of engagement plays an important role in refashioning identi-
ties and relationships of people who are at odds with one another. Indeed, why 
would people withdraw peacefully from anti-democratic modes of governance 
and ways of living if it were not for a more empowering way of engaging with 
one another (Dewey, 1987, 1988)? 
Hypothesis Two (H2): Peace Building
H2: The process of peace building, as the transformation of conflictual re-
lationships into more sustainable and peaceful ones, includes deliberative en-
gagement as a principal component. 
Deliberative engagements understood as learning environments are crucial 
if peace building is to be successful at creating sustainable and peaceful re-
lationships (Lederach, 1997: 20), especially between peoples who are living 
together in a post-conflict society.11 By the way, these engagements have little 
to do with tolerance. “[T]olerance doesn’t welcome. It allows, endures, in-
dulges….It doesn’t ask us to care for the stranger. It doesn’t even invite us to 
know each other, to be curious, to be open to be moved or surprised by each 
other” (Tippett, 2016: 15-16). If to be tolerant is “to leave that person alone, 
unhindered to pursue his or her own way”, then it is unlikely that “people 
might learn about – and possibly from – one another” (Niebuhr, 2008: 40). 
an insight in this regard. “Thinking through” is the deliberative engagement that is referred 
to in this essay, but thinking is something quite different. “Thinking”, for DeVries, allows 
one “to be alone with one’s mind in the long stretch of life meeting the untold number of 
moments when one’s fundamental aloneness will confront one” (DeVries, 2016: B15). Those 
crisis moments when one feels alone and unprotected from those who are tearing apart one’s 
life and identity are moments that the demagogue and spin doctor can manipulate to their 
advantage. Thus, it might be of some value “to have something interesting going on inside 
your head” and “to have things inside your head to absorb your attention” (DeVries, 2016: 
B15) rather than allowing your aloneness to be hijacked. 
10 However, some may say that it does not do the “heavy lifting” that Hannah Arendt associat-
ed with thinking, i.e., deliberative engagement may justify what Arendt says is unthinkable 
(Berkowitz, 2010: 240). 
11 Given that deliberative engagements include the sort of Socratic thinking that is prized by 
Martha C. Nussbaum, she is correct to point out that such thinking “is particularly important 
in societies that need to come to grips with the presence of people who differ by ethnicity, 
caste, and religion. The idea that one will take responsibility for one’s own reasoning, and 
exchange ideas with others in an atmosphere of mutual respect for reason, is essential to the 
peaceful resolution of differences, both within a nation and in a world increasingly polarized 
by ethnic and religious conflict” (Nussbaum, 2010: 54).
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Even worse, the indifference that is wrapped up in the dictum “to live and let 
live” may cultivate misbehavior (Rosenblum, 2016).12 All in all, peace build-
ing requires moving beyond simply tolerating others, beyond the coexistence 
of diversity and to ratify mutual acceptance. 
Yet it is against this background of tolerance that we can discern the un-
derlying mechanism of creating sustainable and peaceful relationships. Being 
tolerant or intolerant of people is largely about who they are – i.e., identities, 
though what they have done or not done is often connected to how tolerant 
or intolerant we are in our relationships with them. The crucial point is this: 
the relationships that are in need of changing are a reflection of certain sali-
ent identities. In the case of Bosnia, for example, the many ethno-nationalists 
exaggerate the salience of their ethno-nationalist belonging, a salience that 
does not go unnoticed by others. It is no wonder, then, that identities are said 
to be socially constructed, de-constructed, and reconstructed (Putnam, 2007: 
159). Their “constructed-ness” can be understood in two important ways. First, 
identities are social constructs insofar as they draw on a “variety of authentic 
elements held in common within a group: a common history, language, or re-
ligion; or common customs, cultural expressions, experiences, value, griev-
ances, or aspirations” (Kelman, 2004: 65). Second, not only is self-identifying 
important, but what also matters is how others identify you, i.e., what category 
or class they assign you (Yue, Li and Feldman, 2016: 77). Both forms of iden-
tifying figure into how people are treated in a society. Again, ethno-nationalist 
identity continues to play a prominent role in the lives of many Bosnians, often 
determining relationships that treat some as friend and others as foe. For their 
part, some Bosnians have deconstructed ethnicity as a salient line of social 
division, even though ethnicity itself remains personally important. Perhaps 
ethnic endogamy has something to do with this deconstruction in Bosnia.13 
But for those who have not been affected by endogamy, they need to establish 
12 Perhaps this meaning of tolerance is a poor but inevitable way of dealing with the other 
once tradition is lost, tradition that expresses unity within multiplicity as noted by Rusmir 
Mahmutćehajić (2005; 2000a; 2000b). Although Mahmutćehajić frames his work within the 
particulars of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the following statement is a clear nudge towards the 
universal: “The Bosnian-Herzegovinan model of tolerance and inter-religious relationships 
can be interpreted as accepting that all religion should enable the reunion of all human beings 
with their single transcendent origin” (Mahmutćehajić, 2000b: 16). In a different context, be-
ing tolerant may lead (or has led to) more and more people taking up a cult of ignorance and 
wallowing in anti-intellectualism. Loud repetition is taken as evidence for whatever claim 
some see fit to adopt, e.g., climate change is a myth. 
13 Putnam (2007: 160-161) notes that many Americans have done the same sort of salience 
reduction with religion. However, I am afraid that the events of 9-11 have once again made 
religion salient in the eyes of many Americans. 
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deeply meaningful and sustainable identities and relationships resulting from 
interaction and integration. 
What are some specific ways in which this can be pursued in practical 
terms? Perhaps ordinary conversations that build casual social connections 
may be the best one can hope for early on (Thornbury and Slade, 2006: 25). 
An exchange of pleasantries at the market place may be all that the shopkeeper 
and housewife can muster towards each other: “Kako si ti?” “Dobro, hvala.” 
But chitchatting and more transformative communication like dialogue and, 
eventually, deliberative engagement, are needed so that enemy images can be 
broken down, leading people in conflictual relationships to gain an ever great-
er understanding of one another’s positions, needs, and interests. As I see it, 
deliberative engagement offers the most robust source of change, since it in-
corporates dialogue, “a process of genuine interaction through which human 
beings listen to each other deeply enough to be changed by what they learn…
[a process through which] one’s mind opens to absorb new views, enlarge per-
spectives, rethink assumptions and modify judgements” (Saunders, 1999: 82). 
And it incorporates critical thinking, “the ability to seek out and evaluate rele-
vant information on a given topic, to question and assess the value of different 
arguments, and to draw informed conclusions” (Makau and Marty, 2001: 11). 
It is hoped that this enhanced understanding and openness to change will lead 
to a lessening of mistrust and uncertainty and more fellow-feeling, which are 
important for reconciliation, “a mutual, conciliatory accommodation between 
formerly antagonistic groups” that is very much needed in the Balkans (Conc-
es, 2009: 22).14 Of course, another option is the construction of an alternative 
identity (and its associated relationships), that is, a transcendent identity, not 
to replace the particular ethno-nationalist identities, but to “stand alongside” 
them in a more prominent position (Kelman, 2004: 65). This identity is re-
flected in discourse about Bosnia as a country inhabited by Bosnian Muslims 
(Bosniaks), Bosnian Serbs, and Bosnian Croats who each share the identity of 
citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Unfortunately, this identity, which reflects 
another type of nationalism – civic nationalism, a supraethnic nationalism de-
14 There are reasons to be suspicious of such an idealized view of deliberative engagement 
(see Brennan, 2016; Mendelberg, 2002). Make no mistake: we should not delude ourselves 
into thinking that learning more about our enemy or our adversary will always lead to more 
pleasant relations. It may result in the exact opposite; our worst fears about the other may be 
confirmed: “My neighbor is a terrorist!” In fact, developing trust with a stranger or an adver-
sary usually takes more than ongoing deliberative engagement; it takes acting in certain ways 
and not in other ways. Yet deliberative engagement is a portal through which one can act in a 
more respectful way towards another person or to a group to which they belong. 
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void of the ethno-chauvinism and ethno-xenophobia – is not currently as sali-
ent as its ethnic counterpart for many Bosnians.15 
It is the integral role that deliberative engagement plays in democracy and 
peace building that makes them social projects, albeit difficult ones. However, 
democracy and peace building are also physical projects. Crowding into close 
proximity and relations of immediate reciprocity are affected by the presence 
or absence of particular types of objects (often physical). What sort of objects 
could these be? Could the presence of certain objects make the physical envi-
ronment so toxic that some people will not move into close proximity with the 
other? If so, what would it take to make those environments more livable as 
communities of diverse peoples? 
Hypothesis Three (H3): Evocative Objects
H3: Some objects are evocative for groups of people and, as such, either 
attract or repel members of groups depending on whether those objects are 
construed positively or negatively. 
I find it interesting that the German philosopher Martin Heidegger began his 
analysis in “The Thing” by raising the issue of nearness: “Nearness, it seems, 
cannot be encountered directly. We succeed in reaching it rather by attending 
to what is near. Near to us are what we usually call things” (Heidegger, 1971b: 
166). Whether we find ourselves amongst things or we surround ourselves with 
things, things are near to us. It is this notion of nearness, and not the “thingly 
character of the thing” (Heidegger, 1971b: 167), which I borrow from Heide-
gger. The way in which things become relevant to the concerns of this essay is 
connected with the way in which things become objects in the Heideggerian 
sense of the term: “An independent, self-supporting thing may become an ob-
ject if we place it before us, whether in immediate perception or by bringing it 
to mind in a recollective re-presentation” (Heidegger, 1971b: 167). Since near-
ness is to be understood in terms of our awareness of the thing which makes it 
an object, we must be aware of things as objects in order for them to become 
important for us in a lived sense. 
John Berger and Jean Mohr, in their insightful work Another Way of Telling: 
A Possible Theory of Photography (1982), bring color to this “lived sense” by 
informing us that circumstances do matter when we look at our surroundings 
(Berger and Mohr, 1982: 118-119). For example, I “read” my surroundings one 
15 Civic nationalism asserts “that the nation should be composed of all those … who subscribe 
to the nation’s political creed. This nationalism is called civic because it envisages the nation 
as a community of equal, rights-bearing citizens, united in patriotic attachment to a shared 
set of political practices and values” (Ignatieff, 1994: 6-7). For a discussion of American 
nationalism, see Pei, 2003. 
Dijalog18
way when I drive my car to the university, but “read” them in a very different 
way when I run down that same street as part of my morning workout. That 
is, when driving down Harney Street on my way to campus, I see numerous 
trees along the street. Running down that same street as part of my morning 
workout, however, allows me to identify those trees as ginkgoes. Perhaps this 
goes to show that I am a responsible driver and a curious runner. In any case, 
each way of “reading” offers a unique view of what I pass. Also, in addition to 
each act of looking being “threaded” with meaning, sometimes there is a felt 
expression of emotion. Pain, sadness, and joy are some of the emotions that 
might be threaded along with meaning. Perhaps I am odd in this regard, for 
each time I see a ginkgo tree, I feel surprise and joy. Don’t ask me why; it has 
something to do with helping my father plant a ginkgo tree when I was a boy. 
This leads us to a new vocabulary in regards to the objects of our surround-
ings. Another way to phrase this “lived sense” is to say that some objects be-
come evocative (special) for us. They are evocative because they have impor-
tant meaning for us and invoke certain emotions in us when we gaze at them, 
hold them, or even recall memories about them (Turkle, 2007). In each case, 
“something comes to our mind”. For example, a necktie that a colleague at the 
University of Prishtina took off and tied around my neck while I waited in line 
at a branch office of Raiffeisen Bank is evocative for me. It was and still is a 
token of friendship, and wearing it reminds me of the wonderful experiences 
I had as a Fulbright Scholar in Kosovo. The holding power of this necktie is 
strong for me because of its place within a particular cognitive and emotional 
nexus of mine, one that relates a myriad of evocative objects with one another, 
including those experienced during my stay in Kosovo. The colorfulness of 
my lived world is a direct result of how my life is entangled with these objects. 
Consequently, I am not willing to give up my tie. 
None of us have a totally unique set of evocative objects, however. There is 
some overlap. For example, my red and orange necktie is evocative for at least 
one other person – i.e., my colleague in Prishtina, though this does not mean that 
the tie is evocative for both of us in exactly the same way. Note, too, that there 
are some objects in my home and university office that are evocative for larger 
groups of people. For instance, there is an oil painting of my father’s hanging 
in my flat that is evocative for my group of siblings, albeit a group of three. 
This painting, to which my siblings are attached, is exhibited in my dwelling 
(Heidegger, 1971a: 145-161), a very private space within which I feel at home 
physically, emotionally, and spiritually. So private, in fact, that few have been to 
my flat. Consequently, few have seen my father’s painting of a blue vase. 
But many objects are evocative for a great number of people because the 
objects occupy public space. For example, a photo of mine taken of post-war 
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Sarajevo, if displayed on my department’s hallway bulletin board, would prob-
ably be evocative for a number of people. And just think how many more 
people would find that photo to be so if it were posted on my Facebook time-
line. I believe the number of Likes associated with that photo would prove me 
right. More importantly for this essay, there are evocative objects that form 
parts of cityscapes that are cognitively, affectively, and conatively informing 
in unique ways for members of certain groups. Groups are formed based on 
a wide range of identities, such as class, religion, gender, and sexual orienta-
tion. In many parts of the world, peoples’ dominant identity centers on their 
ethno-nationalism, a nationalism that “is based on descent. The true nation is a 
solidarity grounded in what its adherents understand to be primordial ties, not 
any instrumental or accidental connections” (Hollinger, 1995: 133). As noted 
previously, for many in the Balkans, one’s ethno-nationalist identity is a very 
important part of who they are, often much more socially salient than being a 
Bosnian or Kosovan, which is about being a citizen of a country and not about 
being a member of a nation defined in terms of ethnicity, culture, and language 
(Conces, 2005: 143-162). 
Taking our cue once again from the Balkans, the concrete, material reality 
of ethno-nationalism is visible to the naked eye. Members of an ethnic group 
that dominates within a region of a country may see some objects as evocative 
insofar as these objects are “wrapped in” meaning that harkens back to a time 
when this group fought for the creation of their own state, which they largely 
rule today. Flags, murals, and graffiti are all empowered to stir pride in mem-
bers of that ethnic community. However, the ethnic group that had the territory 
wrestled from them and that is now just another minority may see these same 
objects as reminders of their being victims of past atrocities, stirring in them 
seething hatred and desire for retribution. The one and the same object is evoc-
ative in very different ways depending on who is viewing it; in other words, 
object evocativity is observer-sensitive. 
For that reason, one would never expect evocative objects that positive-
ly reflect the ethno-nationalism of one’s rivals to be found within their own 
house. Again, this is because one’s house is usually not just a place to inhabit 
or occupy, but a place to dwell as Heidegger rightly points out. Perhaps ‘home’ 
is a more common term. For the die-hard ethno-nationalist, the day begins and 
ends in a place adorned with evocative objects that reflect his ethno-nationalist 
identity. Moreover, when all the homes that he has ever lived in – not only 
those of adulthood, but also those of his childhood and his adolescence – have 
been adorned in a similar way, it is not far-fetched to think that those homes 
have had an effect on the inhabitant’s identity complex. Why would we expect 
a person who woke up every morning to a nationalist flag above his bed, eats 
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breakfast on a kitchen table littered with nationalist pamphlets, and grabs his 
coat and boots from a closet adjacent to a portrait of a nationalist leader, not to 
have taken his ethno-nationalist identity seriously wherever he goes?16 Indeed, 
we should expect him to be intolerant of the ethnic other. 
Do these ethno-nationally charged objects ever exist outside of the immedi-
ate home environment, perhaps in settings that are more public? Do they ever 
form parts of cityscapes? They most certainly do. They are found while stroll-
ing through the streets of Sarajevo and Mostar in Bosnia, and Prishtina and 
North Mitrovica in Kosovo, with some places having a preponderance of pub-
licly situated objects, evocatively informing in relatively well-defined ways 
for members of different ethno-nationalist groups. Flags are a commonly used 
marker illustrating the so-called cult of the flag. In Sarajevo, one can occasion-
ally find the flag of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–1998) with 
its Fleur-de-lis, as well as minarets flying the flag of the Islamic Community of 
Bosnia – the green flag with a white crescent and star.17 These objects resonant 
favorably with much of the Bosniak community. In Mostar, it is not unusual 
to find the flag of Croatia with its red and white checkerboard dangling from 
lamp posts in the western part of the city dominated by ethnic Croats. Travel-
ling south to Kosovo, one finds the Albanian flag flying in many parts of the 
country, with the state and civil flags of Serbia showing up only in areas domi-
nated by ethnic Serbs.18 Murals and photos, as well as monuments and shrines, 
are also found in abundance throughout the country, again reflecting an ethnic 
group’s dominance in those locales. A short car ride can take you from stand-
16 I am grateful to Riley Ruzicka for offering a similar discussion in a paper he submitted in my 
spring 2017 Social Philosophy class at the University of Nebraska at Omaha. 
17 This raises two interesting points about religious objects. First, the practicing of one’s reli-
gion is a personal matter, so the thought of eliminating evocative objects of a religious nature 
will raise an uproar. Second, this essay focuses on physical objects, but what about the sound 
that an altar boy makes when he rings the church bells before Sunday mass or the ezan – the 
Islamic call to worship – that is recited by the muezzin from the minaret of a mosque? These 
are also evocative but in different ways, and their range is not limited by eyesight. Of course, 
some physical objects can be seen as far as one can hear a church bell, such as the large cross 
on Mount Hum overlooking the Bosnian city of Mostar. Straying from the strictly religious, 
popular music is also something that may distinguish ethnic communities, e.g., hearing the 
music of Thompson, a Croatian rock band, being played on the Croat (west) side of the 
Neretva River in Mostar as compared to the music of Amira Medunjanin, a sevdah singer, 
coming from the Bosniak (east) side of that city. And let us not forget the sense of smell; the 
aroma of bacon curling up from a grill is informative in this regard as well. In a way, the arc 
of one’s ethnic identity extends far and wide. 
18 Although I am not sure whether these are instances of the appropriation of flags, I have wit-
nessed this phenomenon in Belfast, Northern Ireland, where I have seen the Palestinian flag 
in Catholic neighborhoods (e.g., Falls Road) and the Israeli flag in Protestant neighborhoods 
(e.g., Shankill Road). 
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ing in front of a large mural in Prishtina of the first President of Kosovo, Ibra-
him Rugova, to gazing at a calendar photo of Slobodan Milosevic on a bakery 
wall in North Mitrovica, each being viewed as either a hero or a war criminal 
depending on who is doing the viewing, an ethnic Albanian or an ethnic Serb. 
Perhaps another way of highlighting the importance of this identity is to say 
the following: “If you want to know a people’s ethno-nationalist sentiments, 
don’t ask them, just look at their surroundings.” Of course, many people do not 
live by themselves, but live in neighborhoods surrounded by others. 
Locales reflecting these differing dominances are no surprise, given that 
evocative objects have both centripetal and centrifugal effects on people. For 
instance, objects favored by a dominant ethnic group can encourage members 
of that group to congregate in a particular place. These objects are centripetal 
for them; they elicit in the members of the dominant group a feeling of being 
welcomed in that place and prompt them to behave in certain ways, including 
ways that help build cohesion among members of that group. These same ob-
jects, however, are centrifugal for members of the once powerful ethnic mi-
nority. The objects elicit an unwelcoming feeling in them and discourage them 
from being in that place, from interacting and establishing relationships with 
members of the dominant group (Conces, 2013b: 10). In this case, interethnic 
cohesion is sacrificed for the sake of intraethnic cohesion. Whereas the mes-
sage to members of the dominant group is “You are welcome!” the message to 
those of the minority (now non-dominant) group is “Go away!” 
Perhaps the degree to which an individual moves (orientates) toward an ob-
ject or the area that surrounds an object (centripetal movement), or moves (ori-
entates) away from an object or its area (centrifugal movement) is not simply 
a matter of having one kind of feeling versus another kind of feeling, feeling 
good versus feeling not so good. It is also a matter of believing, if we agree 
with the American philosophers W. V. Quine and J. S. Ullian that believing is 
a “disposition to respond in certain ways when the appropriate issue arises” 
(Quine and Ullian, 1978: 10). For Quine and Ullian, believing that Hannibal 
crossed the Alps is to be disposed to respond in one of a number of ways, in-
cluding simply saying “Yes” when asked. More important for this essay is their 
example of frozen foods: “To believe that frozen foods will thaw on the table is 
to be disposed, among other things, to leave [my italics] such foods on the ta-
ble only when one wants them thawed” (Quine and Ullian, 1978: 10). This ex-
ample helps us to grasp how believing is relevant to objects and enclaves in the 
Balkans. Perhaps to believe that to live my life as an ethnic Serb will preserve 
the Serb nation against its rivals is to be disposed to respond by only living and 
interacting with fellow Serbs. That is to say, to respond as a Serb ethno-na-
tionalist in this case is to leave oneself in a particular neighborhood, with a 
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certain group of people who surround themselves with a certain kind of object. 
After a while this sort of behavior erodes diversity by excluding members of 
other ethnic groups from those areas in which Serbs are congregating. Again, 
for those strongly tied to their ethno-nationalist sentiments, the messages are 
“loud and clear” and the behavior follows suit; hence, a place becomes a sanc-
tuary for some and a wasteland for others. The enclave has arrived whether by 
intentional design or by an “invisible hand” mechanism (Nozick, 1974: 18-22). 
To be clear about the magnitude of the impact of these objects, an activity 
as ordinary as dog walking provides a person with an opportunity for “con-
tact and conviviality” with others, a chance to share ideas and concerns with 
strangers on the path (Macauley, 2007: 105). However, that opportunity may 
not arise if the path is within eyesight of objects that trigger terrible memories 
and stir sadness or anger in the dog walker. In the walker’s mind, then, that 
path is “off limits.” There are many objects along a walking path, most of 
which a person is unaware of or indifferent to. But it may only take a few an-
tagonistic objects along the path for the path itself to be badly stigmatized. It is 
the thoughts and feelings connected to those antagonistic objects that become 
associated with the walking path as a locale and that puts it out of bounds. 
Perhaps there is a direct correlation between the size of an out of bounds locale 
and factors such as the number of antagonistic objects in that locale, the degree 
to which the person finds them antagonistic, and the distribution of those ob-
jects throughout the locale. Perhaps entire countries and regions can become 
off limits in the same way. 
Should We Decolorize Evocative Objects?
Revealing evocative objects as signposts that color or inform the landscape 
in which people go about their everyday lives raises an important question. 
Should we only think and talk about evocative objects in ways that highlight 
their color (i.e., identities, history, and emotions) and, thus, their seductive-
ness? Or should we at some point revert to more abstract discourse in the 
hope of making these objects “black and white” (or generic), thereby reducing 
their attractiveness? I believe there are two reasons for decolorizing or ge-
nericizing objects. First, seduced by the colorfulness of the evocative objects 
of others may lead us to think that we are just like the others because we too 
immerse ourselves in the colorfulness of our own objects. Someone may say, 
“I think many people in Sarajevo or Prishtina won’t want their flags or murals 
replaced. I know I wouldn’t if I was in their shoes.” Worse than this willy-nilly 
“comradery”, the seduction may lead people to be disinclined to take seriously 
the dynamic between evocative objects and ethnic enclaves, as well as meas-
ures proposed to address that dynamic. Second, what happens if the concrete, 
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descriptive language of another group’s evocative objects resonates with my 
own identities, including my ethno-nationalist prejudices and biases? Feeling a 
strong kinship with another group may again diminish the importance of both 
the dynamic and the counter-measures. What I am advocating here, then, is the 
“removal of color” so that we neither adopt the primacy of a colorful landscape 
of evocative objects nor align ourselves with certain groups of people through 
their evocative objects. In a sense, I am proposing irreverence towards some 
objects that matter to people, grasping the dynamic on dispassionate grounds 
by means of a heuristic device that uses the language of abstract mathematics. 
The empirical underpinnings of this device are found in recent work in 
the social sciences, particularly in the work delineating two different thinking 
processes or cognitive systems (Kahneman, 2003; 2013; Stanovich and West, 
2000). The key features of what has come to be known as System 1 and System 
2 types of cognitive processes are that “the operations of System 1 are typically 
fast, automatic, effortless, associative, implicit (not available to introspection), 
and often emotionally charged…”, whereas “operations of System 2 are slow-
er, serial, effortful, more likely to be monitored and deliberately controlled; 
they are also relatively flexible and potentially rule governed” (Kahneman, 
2003: 698). Examples that are indicative of faster System 1 operations include 
understanding simple sentences and solving the addition problem 2 + 2, while 
examples of the slower System 2 operations include filling out a tax form and 
searching one’s memory to identify a surprising sound (Kahneman, 2013: 21-
22). The significance of System 2 thinking for this essay’s heuristic device 
becomes clear once we realize that the mental events that the heuristic looks 
to set aside are related to System 1 thinking. Recognizing an object as evoc-
ative in an ethno-nationalist way fits well with the System 1 examples. This 
recognition is essentially a “learned association” between object and idea (with 
emotional content) that has “become fast and automatic through prolonged 
practice” (Kahneman, 2013: 22). When a Serb nationalist, born and breed in 
North Mitrovica, sees the Albanian flag flying in Prishtina, he may think “oc-
cupier”; when he hears persons speaking Albanian, he may think “Muslim.” 
He is disposed to respond in such ways when confronted with certain imag-
es and sounds. There is nothing quick or slow about it; it just happens. But 
working through more complicated expressions of mathematics related to the 
heuristic in Figures 1–3 squares with Kahneman’s System 2 examples, with 
thinking that is more deliberative and devoid of the emotional baggage. Sys-
tem 1 thinking cannot easily comprehend the matrix and the various numerical 
manipulations, so System 2 thinking navigates through this world of numbers. 
With this in mind, the approach taken here is to present evocative objects 
in an abstract and mathematized form through System 2 thinking, so that the 
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connection between evocative objects and ethnic enclaves is more “black and 
white,” and less susceptible to System 1 thinking with its emotional charge and 
bias.19 The abstraction is formed by filtering the information of these objects 
and selecting two variables that are relevant for understanding the dynamic 
between evocative objects and ethnic enclaves: dominant and non-dominant 
group membership and how an object is valued (i.e., as a protagon, neutagon, 
and antagon).20 The abstraction is bound to mathematization as expressed by a 
matrix, pushing the abstraction and impartiality even further.21 
Evocativity Matrix (e-matrix) 
The dynamic presented in the dominant group/non-dominant group two-ob-
server situation within an ethnic enclave can be redescribed, generalized, and 
mathematically formalized by an evocativity matrix (e-matrix) – a 3x3 matrix 
that presents how the viewings of the same evocative object by two observers, 
one from the dominant group and the other from the non-dominant group, 
interact in ways that give rise to the centripetal and centrifugal effects of these 
evocative objects and in ways which then give rise to ethnic enclaves.22 
The e-matrix shows the evocative outcomes (cloud values), represented by 
dyads, for every possible combination of three kinds of objects that are cog-
nitively and affectively evocative: protagons, antagons, and neutagons. Pro-
tagons are objects that are positively evocative; antagons are objects that are 
negatively evocative; and neutagons are objects that are evocative only insofar 
as the observer is cognizant of their presence as devoid of positivity and nega-
tivity. As an example of an e-matrix, Figure 1 is a possible set of outcomes for 
19 Perhaps what we need is something like “theory-induced blindness” (Kahneman, 2013: 277). 
20 This abstraction process used to address disconnection and impartiality is neither a matter 
of increasing the number of examined perspectives (à la Adam Smith’s [2009] “impartial 
spectator”) nor does it include a hypothetical viewer in a state of partial ignorance and who 
tries to arrive at an outcome (like the person created by John Rawls’s [2000] “veil of igno-
rance”). Instead, the situation is abstracted so that it makes it more unlikely that a person’s 
preferences, which they are well aware of, will “distort” their understanding of the situation. 
The matrix “deadens” the influence of various orientations without a Rawlsian veil. 
21 Whether this matrix and the associated understanding of the dynamic holds true is a matter 
of empirical study. If this is to be pursued, however, the matrix offers an additional benefit. 
It makes the essay vulnerable to Popperian falsifiability: “…a theory that is mathematized 
[is preferable] to a theory that is not. This is due to the fact that it is generally much easier to 
obtain falsifiable conclusions from clearly stated propositions than from vague and informal 
claims” (Hartmann and Sprenger, 2010: 4). 
22 We can also think of this in terms of a field, a confined area within which there are numerous 
objects. These objects become evocative when a person inhabits the field. It is only at that 
point that evocativity makes sense, that there are centripetal and centrifugal forces at work, 
and that measurements can be made. 
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how one evocative variable (dominant or non-dominant group membership) is 
related to the value variable (the different kinds of evocative objects).23
Evocative 
Object




















Figure 1. Evocativity Matrix (e-matrix) and Its Cloud Values and 
Transformations
The likelihood of transformations increases with protagon-neutagon dyads 
(◊→, “likely to yield”) and decreases with antagon-neutagon dyads (~◊→, 
“not likely to yield”). 
In the 3x3 matrix of Figure 1, the dominant (d) group’s three categories 
of evocative objects – protagon (Pd), neutagon (Nd), and antagon (Ad) with 
their particular evocativity values24 – form the columns of the matrix. Similar-
ly, the non-dominant (nd) group’s three evocative categories (Pnd, Nnd, and 
And with their particular values) form the rows of the matrix. Each cell of the 
matrix shows a cloud value (cellular evocativity), that is, the evocative value 
of an object viewed as evocative by two observers who are aware of how the 
other views the object. It is called a cloud value because it goes beyond how 
each observer individually assesses the evocativity of an object by identifying 
23 The communities in which people actually live are populated by multiple antagonistic groups 
and exhibit multiple evocative variables, thereby inflating the number of possible cloud values.
24 The evocativity values given to each of the three categories of object are part folk/common-
sense psychological and part informed intuitive judgement assignments. Oddly enough, the 
category values and mathematics here seem to best capture the psychological intuitions of 
how we think and feel about evocative objects. The protagon, an object construed positively, 
is given a baseline value of 1. The neutagon is given a value of 1.5, which is slightly removed 
from the baseline but far removed from the antagon. It is not much different from a protagon 
– we are not much bothered by it – but it is very different from an antagon; compared to the 
antagon, the neutagon is “not all that bad”. The antagon is given a value twice removed from 
the baseline, the value of 2, since it is just the opposite of the protagon being negative in 
nature. Given how these evocativity values are formulated, I treat them as “plausible initial 
hypotheses” (see Gopnik and Schwitzgebel, 1998). These hypotheses are ready to be tested. 
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it in terms of a protagon, neutagon, or antagon. It is calculated as the quotient 
of the value associated with a particular kind of object viewed by a member of 
the dominant observer group (numerator) divided by the value associated with 
a particular kind of evocative object viewed by a member of a non-dominant 
observer group (denominator). Each of the nine cloud values is associated with 
a specific dyad of evocative objects, one from each observer group. Thus, for 
example, when an object is viewed as a protagon by a member of the dominant 
group, as well as by a member of the non-dominant group, then the PdPnd 
dyad has a cloud value of 1. On the other hand, if an object is viewed as an 
antagon by the dominant group but as a protagon by the non-dominant group, 
the AdPnd dyad has a value of 3. 








Figure 2. E-Matrix Rankings
The effect of group dominance is reflected in the disproportionate move-
ment above equilibrium as compared to below it. 
When the nine cells are examined, we notice some interesting relationships 
as shown in Figure 2. First, whenever members of the dominant group and the 
non- dominant groups view the evocative object as being of the same kind, the 
cloud value is 1, which represents equilibrium (⇌) or harmony between how 
members of the two groups view that object. You can find equilibriums de-
scending diagonally across the matrix. Second, the cloud values are the highest 
when the dominant group views an object as an antagon or a neutagon and the 
non-dominant group views that same object as either a protagon or a neutagon. 
Third, the cloud values stray from equilibrium the least when the dominant 
group views the object as either a protagon or a neutagon and the non-dom-
inant group views the same object as a neutagon or an anatagon (see Figure 
3). What these last two points show is that the difference from equilibrium 
increases more dramatically when the dominant group is “antagonized” and 
increases less dramatically when that same group is “protagonized” regard-
less of the non-dominant group’s viewing. Perhaps the significance of these 
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different rates of increase is that the prevalence of AdPnd and AdNnd clouds 
is indicative of what might be found in more homogeneous ethnic enclaves, 
whereas the prevalence of NdAnd and PdAnd clouds is indicative of a less 
homogeneous enclave that exhibits a high degree of tolerance on the part of 
the dominant group.25 Last, by making a couple reasonable assumptions about 
human behavior results in some interesting claims about the likelihood of cer-
tain transformative processes (boldfaced in the PdNnd, AdNnd, NdPnd, and 
NdAnd cells in Figure 1). The first claim arises from the assumption that some 
identities, like ethno-nationalism, are inherently combative, such that one eth-
no-nationalist might say to another of an opposing “ism,” “What you like, I 
dislike.” The result is that when a neutagon and a protagon form a dyad, there 
is likely to be a dramatic shift in the cloud value away from equilibrium once 
the neutagon becomes an antagon as shown by Nd(Nd◊→Ad)Pnd 3/1=3 and 
PdNnd(Nnd◊→And) 1/3=.33. The second claim is based on the assumption 
that even with the inherent combativeness of some identities, the likelihood of 
a neutagon becoming a protagon when faced with the other’s antagon, may be 
remote because the required investment in a neutagon to make it a protagon is 
too great as shown by Nd(Nd~◊→Pd)And 1/3=.33 and AdNnd(Nnd~◊→Pnd) 
3/1=3. How many people will say, “I am no longer indifferent towards what 
you dislike; in fact, I now like it because you don’t like it”? Perhaps not many. 
Figure 3. Distribution of Dyadic Cloud Values
25 Whether the country-wide demographics are more like Bosnia or more like Kosovo (see fn. 
12) may have an impact on this as well. 
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Cloud values of dyads tend to be driven farther from equilibrium when 
the dominant group sees the object as an antagon rather than as a protagon re-
gardless of how the non-dominant group sees the same object. There is drastic 
decay followed by subtle growth in cloud values as shown by the curve. 
It is important to reiterate that the e-matrix, as well as the assumptions and 
subsequent transformations, are used as a heuristic device to help us think 
about how the viewings of evocative objects by members of dominant and 
non-dominant groups reflect the degree to which these objects are thought to 
be harmonious or antagonistic but only in the abstract. This discussion has 
placed into black and white terms the possibility that tension between mem-
bers of different ethno-nationalist groups (dominant and non-dominant) may be 
manifested through the objects with which people populate their cityscapes.26 
The upshot of the e-matrix and its various relationships of antagonism 
and centripetal/centrifugal effects have much to do with the larger canvas of 
post-conflict society. With democracy and peace building on the line, it is no 
wonder that certain evocative objects take center stage.27 The proliferation of 
evocative objects that stir animosity within a country can greatly affect wheth-
er its society is multiethnic or plural monoethnic, as well as the prospects for 
democracy and peace building. How could all this building be achieved if 
evocative objects carve out space in ways that limit the interaction and integra-
tion of different ethnic peoples within a country’s urban and rural areas? The 
e-matrix helps us to think about these objects, albeit in the abstract.28 Insofar 
as there is an urgency to figure out what to do with ethnic enclaves, a return to 
more concrete language describing the world we live in is required. 
26 My work proceeds at a fairly abstract level. But questions remain: Is it useful to explore 
whether the e-matrix and the rest reflect our lived reality? Is the theoretical framework re-
sponsive to demonstrable findings by social scientists? Is an equilibrium here like the Nash 
equilibrium, one in which participants have no reason to stray? Could participants actually 
be guided towards an equilibrium by rearranging one’s built environment? These are crucial 
questions, but not answered now and not here. 
27 With social media being the global phenomenon that it is, it is common for political and 
cultural theorists to stress the importance of imagery for political struggles. For example, the 
sweeping changes that have taken place in the Middle East and North Africa, including those 
of the Arab Spring, are in part the result of people seeing murals, banners, posters, billboards, 
photos, and monuments as manifesting a revolutionary visual culture (Khatib, 2013; Saber, 
2014; Bayat, 2010). Political struggles are struggles “over presence, over visibility”, so being 
seen is part of the dynamic of political and social change (Khatib, 2013: 1).
28 This may even lead to a geometry (or even a topology) of evocative space and how objects 
populate (even distort) that space. 
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Hypothesis Four (H4): Ethnic Enclaves
H4: Whereas multiethnic societies reflect and promote further interaction 
and integration of different ethnic peoples, thereby furthering the pursuit of 
democracy and peace building in post-conflict settings, plural monoethnic so-
cieties composed of ethnic enclaves do just the opposite.
The multiethnic society is one that is ethnically plural (diverse). This is 
true of Bosnia and Kosovo.29 The demographic fact of pluralism is not enough 
for these two countries to each have a multiethnic society, however. Although 
pluralism allows for the possibility of interethnic interlocutors, without inter-
action between the ethnic groups it makes no difference whether one lives in 
an ethnically heterogeneous society or in an ethnically homogeneous society. 
Perhaps a good way of getting clear about what is needed for there to be 
a multiethnic society is to imagine the absence of interaction. Suppose the 
absence of interaction in a heterogeneous society means that members of eth-
nic groups do not know the existence of the other ethnic groups within their 
society. What would be the significance of calling that society multiethnic? 
None that I can think of. To be fair, perhaps those who adopt a minimalist 
definition of multiethnic society understand a plural society to be one in which 
its members know the existence of the ethnic others but nothing more. Again, 
what would be the significance of living in such a “multiethnic society”? I am 
afraid not much. So what is also needed for there to be a multiethnic society is 
interaction and integration between the ethnic peoples.30 
29 According to the CIA World Factbook 2009, the ethnic breakdown of the population in Bos-
nia is as follows: 48% Bosniak, 33% Serb, 14% Croat, and 5% other. See https://www.cia.
gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook /geos/bk.html. The same source gives the fol-
lowing breakdown for Kosovo: 92.9% Albanian, 1.6% Bosniak, 1.5% Serb, and 4% other. 
However, these figures may underestimate the Serb and Roma populations because they are 
based on the 2011 Kosovo national census, which was boycotted by some Serb and Roma 
communities in southern Kosovo and which excluded northern Kosovo (a Serb dominated 
region). See https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kv.html. 
30 This conception of a multiethnic society is accepted by many within diplomatic circles. For 
example, it served as the foundation of a sweeping critique of Kosovan society by Tim Gul-
dimann, head of the OSCE mission in Kosovo. In September 2008, Guldimann stated that 
Kosovo is “not what we could call a multi-ethnic society … Different communities live 
in Kosovo, but a multi-ethnic society means integration, mutual understanding, tolerance 
and cohabitation. We do not see this” (Beta News Agency, 2008). Skimming through OSCE 
documents gives one a sense that integration is a cornerstone of how the OSCE frames multi-
ethnic societies. See also “Recommendations on Policing in Multi-Ethnic Societies” (OSCE, 
2006), “Human Rights, Ethnic Relations and Democracy in Kosovo” (OSCE, 2008), and 
“The Ljubljana Guidelines on Integration of Diverse Societies” (OSCE, 2012). Although I 
separate diversity from interaction, there are those who do not and who find the value of di-
versity in the openness, exposure to other cultures, and the possibility of personal expansion 
(Gutmann, 1994: 9). 
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Without interaction and integration, life would amount to living in an ethnic 
enclave, one in which there would be evocative objects of the dominant group 
that would be attractive to members of that group but repulsive to members of 
the non-dominant groups. What the e-matrix in Figure 1 suggests in this regard 
is that equilibrium is difficult to achieve and maintain in societies that include 
dominant and non-dominant groups. As to be expected, the flags, murals, and 
monuments of the dominant group serve not only as boundary markers of the 
enclave, but also as warning signs to the non-dominant groups. Fortunately, 
these “markers” and “signs” do not make up the sort of hard and fast “border 
walls” (e.g., the Israeli “separation barrier”)31 that are proliferating around the 
world, but rather something soft, porous and permitting of the possibility for 
exchange. Nonetheless, as clear markers of domains of ethnic dwelling, these 
objects make group identity more visible, particularly ethno-nationalist identi-
ty, which in turn is about claiming political power, control, and agency.32 
Even with it being divided into two entities, each with differing demograph-
ics, Bosnia appears to be in a stronger position to be labeled a multiethnic 
society than Kosovo. In terms of diversity and integration, the percentages of 
the second and third largest ethnic groups are much greater than those of the 
ethnic minorities in Kosovo (see fn. 25), and they are much more dispersed and 
integrated across the country than the minorities in Kosovo, which is essen-
tially composed of a large Albanian enclave peppered with smaller minority 
enclaves. Furthermore, when you take into account some major indices like 
student demographics at the national university and the degree to which there 
is ethnic exogamy (the practice of marrying outside one’s ethnic group) in 
urban centers, once again Bosnia is favored as having a multiethnic society. 
Whereas the University of Sarajevo has ethnic diversity in its student body and 
the capital has a relatively high degree of exogamy, the University of Prishtina 
31 I recognize that the “separation barrier” is just one material component of Israeli rule that is 
manifested in space. As the architect Eyal Weizman (2012: 4) states, the frontiers of the Oc-
cupied Palestinian Territories are “deep, shifting, fragmented and elastic territories”. Thank-
fully, Kosovo is very different from the Occupied Palestinian Territories. 
32 Another way to think of an enclave and its boundary is offered by Heidegger (1971a). The 
ancient meaning of the word ‘Raum’ is “a place cleared or freed for settlement or lodging. A 
space is something that has been made room for, something that is cleared and free, namely 
within a boundary, Greek peras” (Heidegger, 1971a: 154). In the case of the ethnic enclave, 
then, the place within the enclave boundary has been cleared of members of certain ethnic 
groups to the extent that the salient evocative objects of the remaining ethnic group standout. 
Heidegger’s unique twist on the boundary of the enclave is that “a boundary is not that at 
which something stops but, as the Greeks recognized, the boundary is that from which some-
thing begins its presencing” (Heidegger, 1971a: 154). So as one draws near to the boundary 
of the North Mitrovica enclave, one is made away of the presence of the Serb. One sees, 
hears, and smells the Serb – one feels the presence of the Serb. 
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has no Serb students33 and ethnic endogamy (the practice of marrying within 
one’s ethnic group) is the norm in Kosovo. This suggests the degree to which 
Kosovo exhibits a multiethnic society is decidedly lower than that of Bosnia.34
Regardless of the degree to which Bosnia and Kosovo exhibit or do not 
exhibit the characteristics of a multiethnic society, both countries can surely 
benefit from increased interaction and integration if for no other reason than 
it enhances the likelihood of democracy and peace building through increased 
deliberative engagement. To be sure, democracy (especially deliberative and 
participatory democracy) and peace are predicated on a continuing exchange of 
ideas, without which increasing amounts of uncertainty and mistrust are creat-
ed, pushing people farther and farther apart. Emotions are also important here. 
Fear, for example, often contributes to pushing people apart, whereas those 
associated with empathy (including sympathy and compassion)35 help us to 
develop an appreciation of how other people experience their own situations.36 
The more one emphasizes what Bosnia and Kosovo need for democracy 
and peace building to become much more of a reality, the more one realizes 
how much of a threat ethnic enclaves are for those countries. Indeed, Cass Sun-
stein’s (2002) work connecting the phenomena of enclave deliberation with 
group polarization helps us to grasp the realness of that threat to the exchange 
33 This is based on first-hand knowledge of having taught at both universities, as well as inter-
views with university administrators. 
34 According to the OSCE mission in Kosovo, “divisions between communities, between Koso-
vo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs in particular, persist” (OSCE, 2015: 6). This conclusion is 
based on an ethnic distance survey (see Bogardus, 1925, for the concept of social distance) 
that was carried out from February 1 to March 1, 2014 by the Youth Initiative for Human 
Rights in Kosovo (Jović, 2015). This general conclusion is arrived at even though when it 
comes to whether the respondents would accept the other as someone living in their neigh-
borhood, there was markedly less distance. This, to me, is surprising, given that the neigh-
borhood would be a likely meeting place to begin relations of close kinship (spouse, son/
daughter-in-law) which were marked by great distance. Also, past surveys of the former 
Yugoslavia indicate that the ethnic distance in Bosnia was generally lower than that found in 
Kosovo (Gligorijević, 2015). 
35 It should be noted that Paul Bloom (2016) argues that it is compassion and not empathy that 
is the key to being a moral person. In fact, Bloom agrees with Nussbaum (2013: 146) insofar 
as empathy is a tool that can be used by good people as well as bad. 
36 Of the factors of ethnic distance that Jović cites, structural and psychological factors are most 
supportive of this essay. Structurally, living separately “does not contribute to the frequent 
contacts which would generate both the interest-based and friendly relationships” (Jović, 
2015: 270). Psychologically, there is the fear and distrust between members of both commu-
nities, and these feelings are generated by the other factors of ethnic distance, including the 
structural factor (Jović, 2015: 270). The plan to reduce or eliminate certain evocative objects 
figures into Jović’s connecting the psychological with the structural, for by increasing the 
likelihood that people will interact and integrate with one another, there is decreasing fear 
and distrust of the other. 
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of ideas and, subsequently, to democracy and peace building. On the one hand, 
there is what Sunstein calls “enclave deliberation,” which is a process involv-
ing “deliberation among like-minded people who talk or even live, much of 
the time, in isolated enclaves [a state of social homogeneity]” (Sunstein, 2002: 
82). Surprising as it may seem, Sunstein finds enclaves to possess a potential 
benefit: the role they may play as “a safeguard against social injustice and un-
reasonableness” by sustaining views that often do not get the time of day in 
heterogeneous groups (Sunstein, 2002: 82). This benefit may exist for certain 
shared identity communities in Bosnia and Kosovo, such as very small ethnic 
minorities (e.g., the Romani in Bosnia; the Gorani, Ashkali, Romani, and Egyp-
tians in Kosovo;) and sexuality- and gender-based communities (lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, transgender, queer [LGBTQ] in both Bosnia and Kosovo). The same 
would not hold true for the ethnic Croat and Serb communities in Bosnia and 
the ethnic Serb community in Kosovo because of the proximity of their support-
ive ancestral heartlands. On the other hand, there is the phenomenon of group 
polarization, a process whereby “members of a deliberating group predictably 
move toward a more extreme point in the direction indicated by the members’ 
predeliberation tendencies” (Sunstein, 2002: 81). Polarization leading to radi-
calization, violence, and terrorism, however, becomes a concern when (1) eth-
no-nationalism, with its xenophobia and chauvinism, is the dominant shared 
identity of a group (2) that engages in enclave deliberation. It is the insularity of 
the enclave that allows a group to deliberate on a regular basis without having 
sustained exposure to views that compete with theirs, which then allows the fac-
tors that lead to increased polarization to run wild, thereby moving their views 
to the extreme as indicated by their predeliberation tendencies. Although group 
polarization does not necessarily mean a movement in a normatively wrong 
direction, Sunstein (2002: 92) is correct to note that it all “depends on what 
extremists are arguing for”. In the case of a salient shared ethno-nationalism 
identity, the sort of extreme views that come in the wake of its xenophobia and 
chauvinism will be extremely antagonistic towards out-groups, thereby mak-
ing it unlikely that any of the groups will rush towards collective life. 
Where Do We Go From Here? 
What, then, should be done? Sunstein’s (2002: 82) recommendation is 
to create institutional designs that “ensure that when individuals and groups 
move [their views], it is because of the force of the arguments, not because of 
the social dynamics…”. He continues:
It is important to ensure social spaces for deliberation by like-minded persons, 
but it is equally important to ensure that members of the relevant groups are not 
isolated from conversation with people having quite different views. The goal of 
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that conversation is to promote the interests of those inside and outside the relevant 
enclaves, by subjecting group members to competing positions, by allowing them 
to exchange views with others and to see things from their point of view, and by 
ensuring that the wider society does not marginalize, and thus insulate itself from, 
views that may turn out to be right, or at least informative. (Sunstein, 2002: 91) 
I agree with Sunstein that this deliberative process (what I call “deliberative 
engagement”) is important, especially because of its role in democracy and 
peace building. However, I disagree with Sunstein’s assumption that engage-
ment can be effective even while the enclaves remain intact. I find this to be 
overly optimistic, not only because of what he expects deliberation to accom-
plish, but also because ideas and arguments are “bounded” to a spectrum of 
emotions. Indeed, the role of emotions is enormous given that enclave collapse 
is connected to the building of sustainable and peaceful relationships, which, 
in turn, is connected to the de-construction and reconstruction of identities, 
all of which have much to do with emotions. Consequently, an effective way 
for Sunstein’s promoting, subjecting, exchanging, seeing, and ensuring to take 
place, as well as peace building’s transformation of identities and relation-
ships, is through proximal or face-to-face contact. This is the situation within 
which Sunstein’s deliberation by like-minded and not so like-minded persons 
takes place. So the more a society is composed of discrete, non-interactive 
ethnic groups, some of whom have a history of antagonism with one another, 
the more there is a need for close interaction and integration. It will be through 
increased interaction and integration and the demise of ethnic enclaves that 
Bosnia and Kosovo can make progress as multiethnic societies. 
As I am arguing here, we must resist the tendency to think only in terms of 
diversity, as if the mere presence of ethnic others in close proximity will alone 
be enough to bring about a vibrant multiethnic society. This is simply not the 
case, as noted by Robert D. Putnam, who pulled together a great deal of the 
literature concerning the impact of immigration and diversity on social con-
nections (2007). In short, he contends that empirical research supports three 
incongruent hypotheses. The contact hypothesis argues that increased contact 
with an ethnically diverse group of people promotes both interethnic tolerance 
and social solidarity – “diversity reduces ethnocentric attitudes and fosters out-
group trust and solidarity” (Putnam, 2007: 141-142). The conflict hypothesis, 
supported by most of the empirical studies, argues that “diversity fosters out-
group distrust and in-group solidarity” (Putnam, 2007: 142). Last, the constrict 
theory, based on Putnam’s own work on American communities in 2000, con-
founds matters even more by arguing “for the possibility that diversity might 
actually reduce both in-group and out-group solidarity…” (Putnam, 2007: 
149). In other words, “diversity seems to trigger not in-group/out-group divi-
sion, but anomie or social isolation” (Putnam, 2007: 149). 
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What all this goes to show is that the often stated benefits of diversity, the 
benefits of solidarity, trust, and tolerance that are important for a multiethnic 
society, are often not present. This might tempt us to abandon the very project 
of a multiethnic society. But it need not; indeed, it should not. Remember, a 
multiethnic society is one that is both diverse and interactive/integrated. The 
sort of “contact” that promotes enclave collapse and the creation of a multi-
ethnic society often begins with simple communication like conversation, but 
gradually moves to the more complicated forms of dialogue and deliberative 
engagement. Moreover, there is also the transformation of identities that plays 
a role in creating and sustaining multiethnic societies, which makes diversity 
more expansive and dynamic. The upshot is that the evolution of communi-
cation and the creation of new identities (and relationships) does not happen 
overnight, but is often generational, so looking at any one “time slice” might 
support the conflict hypothesis, but comparing a number of “time slices” over 
decades could well support the contact hypothesis. And this is the pace of pro-
gress when it comes to democracy and peace building in post-conflict socie-
ties, especially those with ethnic enclaves.
The question, “Where do we go from here?” needs asking, particularly 
since the disappearance of ethnic enclaves and the creation and maintenance of 
multiethnic societies are not wished into existence. These will unfold through 
the creation of collaborative environments that are largely inclusive, integrat-
ed and interactive, peaceful, and respectful of difference rather than simply 
tolerant of it. Of course, national and municipal governments with internation-
al support (from intergovernmental organizations [IGOs] like the UN and its 
agencies, for example) can work towards sustainable livelihoods by removing 
some of the obstacles to the return of refugees and internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) to areas from which they were forced to leave. Revitalizing local econ-
omies, increasing meaningful employment opportunities, establishing public 
services, providing legal recourse to reclaim land, making grants available 
to rebuild homes, and providing increased policing in neighborhoods are just 
some ways to make those returns a reality. Using institutional means to arrive 
at that reality is often the first step to stimulating the growth of a vibrant multi-
ethnic, post-conflict society. However, other measures are extremely useful 
as well, including an assortment of approaches to create built environments 
and, thus, persons who are more inclined to work towards civic improvement 
rather than their sectarian interests. In the case of Bosnia and Kosovo, for ex-
ample, it includes the elimination of public evocative objects that are likely 
to be divisive along ethnic lines. Dealing with those objects would help to 
make some places more hospitable to members of locally non-dominant ethnic 
groups. The hope is that at some point changing the physical landscape – mak-
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ing evocative jungles into evocative savannas (perhaps even deserts) at least 
when it comes to divisive objects – will allow more people to dwell in the same 
neighborhoods, and feel at home with one another in much deeper ways. It is 
by tinkering with the physical objects that there is an increase in the porosity of 
the social environment, and perhaps the formation of good neighbors and even 
good citizens, though being a good neighbor and a good citizen are not one in 
the same (Rosenblum, 2016). 
The possibility of creating neighborhoods with good neighbors in them 
is both hugely inspiring and intimidatingly difficult. But in order to turn the 
possible into the probable, we need to think about what it means for a per-
son to become a good neighbor. Given that this essay is interested in bringing 
about change in neighborhoods as a means to collapsing ethnic enclaves in 
the Balkans, persons are loosely or minimally neighbors insofar as they are in 
close physical proximity to one another.37 Those who live within and are a part 
of a neighborhood are, in the clearest sense, neighbors to one another. They 
will know and interact with some of their neighbors, while having very little 
knowledge and interaction, if any, with many others. With each new day, how-
ever, comes another opportunity to get to know and to interact with a stranger 
in the neighborhood. Although close proximity may lead to conflict, even vi-
olent conflict due to antagonizing ethno-nationalist identities, it may also lead 
to the sort of face-to-face interactions that allow neighborliness “to cross tribal, 
religious, and ethnic boundaries” and to make one more open to being sym-
pathetic, compassionate, and caring (Margalit, 2002: 42-43). It is hoped that 
over time that person will become a neighbor in a much deeper sense, and may 
even become a good neighbor, i.e., “someone with whom we have a history of 
a meaningful positive, personal relationship” (Margalit, 2002: 45) (and, per-
haps, a beneficent neighbor promoting the good of the others). Consequently, 
here, good neighbor is understood as a much desired transcendent identity that 
will supplant the ethno-nationalist identity, and maybe even the identity of 
citizenship. 
If it is also important to create a certain type of neighbor and to build a 
certain type of neighborhood in order to deal with ethnic enclaves, then what 
means are at our disposal? The enclaves and the divisiveness that they sow 
throughout the social, political, and economic landscape may tempt some to 
call for a legal remedy. However, this approach makes a shambles of the law, 
thus leading some to rely on mass education, mass engagement, and attrition. 
37 Avishai Margalit (2002) reads Kant’s The Metaphysics of Morals (1991), pt. 2, sec. 30, as ren-
dering an extremely expansive understanding of neighbor, so expansive that it means “being 
on the same planet with other humans is enough to make them neighbors” (Kant, 1991: 42). I 
neither read that portion of Kant’s work that way nor understand neighbor in such broad terms. 
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Unfortunately, this approach has the drawback of being too sluggish. Thus, we 
are faced with a dilemma.
The Dilemma (D)
D: Either swift legal means are used to eliminate evocative objects that are 
ethno-nationally provocative in order to break up ethnic enclaves but at the 
expense of violating constitutional and human rights law; or constitutional and 
human rights law are adhered to in favor of slowly eliminating the provocative 
objects through education, deliberative engagement, and attrition but at the 
cost of the continued presence of these objects for the foreseeable future. 
We are caught on the horns of a dilemma. The first horn can be depicted in 
the following way. If legal measures are taken to prohibit the public display 
of objects that are evocative along ethno-nationalist lines, objects that help to 
create and sustain ethnic enclaves, then the degree to which different ethnic 
peoples interact and integrate with one another will be enhanced, thereby in-
creasing the efficacy of both democracy and peace building. Such “meat axe” 
interventions, however, are questionable because they are contrary to constitu-
tional and human rights law in both Bosnia and Kosovo.38
In the case of Bosnia, there is no explicit prohibition of the public display 
of such objects. However, three points need to be raised. First, the Criminal 
Codes of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Article 163), the Repub-
lika Srpska (Article 390), and the Brcko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(Article 160) already make it a crime to publicly incite national, racial, or re-
ligious hatred, discord, or hostility.39 Thus, the display of evocative objects 
would be unlawful if they publicly incited such behavior. Second, the display 
of a particular object could be made unlawful by a special law or it could be 
prescribed as a crime within one of the aforementioned Criminal Codes, both 
of which are permitted by the Constitution of Bosnia. It is important to stress 
that these two points make it clear that there are already legal means by which 
38 Ajna Avdispahić Donko, and Kushtrim Istrefi and Agim Zogaj were kind enough to help me 
work through the legal issues of prohibiting evocative objects in Bosnia and Kosovo, respec-
tively. 
 Some may regard such legal measures as indicative of ends paternalism, in which they would 
say such measures are unacceptable. Granted, as an ends paternalist, I might find the display 
of some evocative objects to be inconsistent with the well-being of the ethno-nationalist qua 
person or qua member of a democratic community, and so recommend the prohibition of 
such displays. Again, it is ends paternalism because these prohibitions forbid people from 
engaging in a certain activity, i.e., “decorating” their space with certain objects of their choice 
that support their ethno-nationalism. However, it is not an obvious case of paternalism be-
cause it is unclear whether the display is self-regarding conduct instead of other-regarding 
conduct (Conces, 2016: 82).
39 See http://www.ohr.int/?page_id=68240.
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evocative objects of a sort could be dealt with in the way that is suggested by 
this essay. Third, although legal mechanisms are in place, it would be a difficult 
path to take given the identity politics of Bosnia. Moreover, the Constitution 
of Bosnia lists human rights guaranteed to all persons within the territory of 
Bosnia (Article II.3), which include freedom of thought, conscience, and, re-
ligion [Article II.3. (g)] and freedom of expression [II.3. (h)]. In addition, the 
Constitution also states that the rights and freedoms set forth by the “European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
and its Protocols [ECHR] shall apply directly in Bosnia and Herzegovina” 
and that the ECHR “shall have priority over all other law” (Article II.2).40 
Moreover, Bosnia is a contracting party to the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), with Article 19 and Article 27 of the UDHR covering the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression, and the right to participate in the cultur-
al life of the community, respectively, and Articles 1 and 18 of the ICCPR 
covering the right to self-determination and the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion, respectively.41 This suggests that the path to legally 
prohibit evocative objects is even more difficult to achieve. 
Nevertheless, these protections are not absolute; there are exceptions. For 
example, Article X.2 of the ECHR states that the right to freedom of expres-
sion “may be subject to … restrictions … as are prescribed by law and are nec-
essary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial 
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime,…” Article 
IX.2 of the ECHR stipulates restrictions for the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion as well. Furthermore, Article 18.3 of the ICCPR makes 
explicit limitations on the “freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs…”42 
Unless the display of evocative objects rises to the levels of concern that these 
articles cite, current laws prohibiting the public display of evocative objects 
are problematic at best. 
As for Kosovo, its Constitution does not have specific provisions that per-
mit prohibitions of the use of ethnic symbols/objects. However, Article 40.2 
of the Constitution does permit the freedom of expression to be “limited by 
law in cases when it is necessary to prevent encouragement or provocation of 
violence and hostility on grounds of race, nationality, ethnicity or religion”.43 
40 See http://www.ccbh.ba/public/down/USTAV_BOSNE_I_HERCEGOVINE_engl.pdf.
41 See http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/index.html and http://www.
ohchr.org/ en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx.




Yet, such limitations, if prescribed by a statue, would have to be “proportion-
ate” and “necessary in a democratic society” (the test of the European Court of 
Human Rights, which Article 53 of the Constitution obliges Kosovo to follow 
when interpreting human rights). As in the case of Bosnia, it will be difficult 
to prohibit the public display of evocative objects given the current legal ap-
paratus in Kosovo. 
Two points need to be clarified. First, given that courts at times fall under 
the influence of what the people want, citizen activists not only directly impact 
the courts through cases, but “it is their hard work that sets up a background in 
politics and public opinion against which constitutional change (through inter-
pretation of the law) begins to seem sensible” (Waldron, 2016: 45). So there is 
at least the possibility that the prohibition of certain objects may be more fa-
vorably looked upon by the courts in Bosnia and Kosovo in the coming years. 
Second, the present constitutions of Bosnia and Kosovo can be revised. 
Here again, citizen activists, among others, can play a role in trying to amend 
their constitution through influencing the legislative branch of their gov-
ernment. The constitutions of these countries each incorporate a legislative 
amendment procedure. In the case of Bosnia, Article X of the Constitution 
stipulates that the Parliamentary Assembly makes the decision, which includes 
a two-thirds majority of those participating in the 42 seat House of Represent-
atives – composed of 28 members from the Federation and 14 members from 
the Republika Sprska; and that there can be no amendment that eliminates or 
diminishes the rights and freedoms cited in Article II: “Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms”. In the case of Kosovo, Chapter IV Article 65 stipulates 
that there must also be a two-thirds majority of participating representatives of 
minority communities. What this means for agents of constitutional change in 
both Bosnia and Kosovo is that change will be difficult to come by. The formal 
procedures are easily exploited within a political landscape that is more or less 
controlled by identity politics, including ethno-nationalist politics. Whether it 
is identity politics taking hold of the institutional arrangements created by the 
Dayton Agreement (e.g., the proportional ethnic representation of the constitu-
ent peoples in the Bosnian Parliamentary Assembly) or simply being manifest-
ed by the ethnic demographics of Kosovo (92.9% Albanian), the possibility for 
the sort of constitutional change that would bring about a reduction in certain 
evocative objects is extremely slim. 
If there is neither legal means to prohibit the public display of certain evoc-
ative objects because of current constitutional and human rights law, nor a 
will to rewrite constitutions and laws, then what is to be done to bring about a 
multiethnic society, and, thus, to stimulate democracy and peace building? Is 
there a viable alternative? There is another approach, but it is the other horn of 
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the dilemma, which is educating and deliberatively engaging the population as 
a whole to give up those evocative objects that are divisive, and by allowing 
the number of enclave supporters to be reduced naturally through attrition due 
to death, identity resignation, or relocation.44 Ways need to be found to educate 
people in reason-giving and emotionally (empathetic) situated dialogue, and 
eventually to participate in engaged deliberation. Although it might be diffi-
cult to imagine enclave stalwarts adopting the values and principles that pro-
mote enclave collapse and that support a multiethnic society, perhaps a more 
likely approach is to persuade those stalwarts that a multiethnic society could 
be a means for them to pursue their own values. “It’s hard to change other 
people’s ideals. It’s much easier to link our agendas to familiar values that 
people already hold” (Grant, 2016: 140). In the case of Kosovo, for example, 
ethnic Serbs harboring strong nationalist sentiments might balk at the value 
of a multiethnic Kosovo with its incursions of the ethnic other into their en-
clave. On the face of it, such incursions could threaten their ideal of cultural 
self-determination and sustainability. Those same incursions, however, might 
be acceptable to ethnic Serbs if they promote increased economic activity and 
employment opportunities within their fading enclave, especially if an eco-
nomic uptick supports their cultural livelihood. Whatever the mechanism, the 
hope is for a self-imposed censorship by those who would like to display en-
clave-making objects. Such censorship would respect difference in order to 
create a more lived sense of equality of dwelling and the opportunities that 
emerge from such equality. Also, let us not forget the impact that reducing a 
society’s ethno-nationalist ranks through attrition may have on changing the 
ideological demography of Kosovo and, thus, the physical landscape as well.45 
However, the disadvantage of this approach is the slow pace at which it tackles 
the dynamics of objects and enclaves. 
This should not come as a surprise. Educating people, in general, requires 
effort, and deliberative engagement will be laborious as well because it will be 
used to challenge some of the ethno-nationalists’ beliefs. Some of these beliefs 
will be trivial, others will be fundamental. Examples of the latter include the 
belief that as the heart of the Serb nation, Kosovo is a place only for Serbs; 
44 The goal of eliminating evocative objects that create and maintain ethnic enclaves, however, 
may not necessitate the purging of all those objects from the environment. Perhaps there are 
“keystone” objects whose removal from an environment could go a long way in furthering 
enclave collapse. For example, flags that are flown from flag poles or displayed on elevated 
billboards, can be seen from far away, thereby enlarging the space considered to be “off 
limits”. The hilltop billboard brandishing the civil flag of Serbia in the Serb enclave of North 
Mitrovica, Kosovo illustrates this visual. 
45 Attrition will only make such a difference if the practice of two schools under one roof is 
discontinued. 
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and the belief that the state flag of Serbia should dominate the sky over the 
land of its people. These and others constitute part of the bulwark of belief that 
will conflict with beliefs that support a multiethnic society. Moreover, attrition 
obviously has a timeline of its own. Because of these issues, progress will be 
slow in coming. Indeed, it is an illusion to believe that dealing with the pop-
ulace in this way could, on its own, bring about the much needed change in 
countries like Bosnia and Kosovo. Rather than abandoning this approach due 
to its sluggishness, I propose supplementing it with an approach that is more 
expeditious – a path between the horns. Where do we look for help?
The Third Path between the Horns 
I propose that the field of civic design is a good starting point for thinking 
about the path between the horns of the dilemma. In particular, one can see the 
work of the landscape architect Christopher Tunnard as offering both connect-
ing and guiding points to this essay’s corrective regarding evocative objects. 
Three points arise from his early “Cities by Design” (1951). First, civic design 
is “a combination of architecture, [city] planning principles and landscape de-
sign and a method of coordinating all the creative arts …to achieve an integra-
tion of art and life” (Tunnard, 1951: 142-143).The point here being that civic 
design is an integrative approach to changing the built environment that people 
inhabit. Second, “our cities are ugly, congested and unfunctional because we 
have neglected the visual aspects in our attempt to make the city work … 
This brings in the social basis of planning … [one] that has a real social basis, 
deeply rooted in the social instinct for cooperation, organization and individual 
expression” (Tunnard, 1951: 143). Tunnard’s understanding of civic design 
clearly connects functionality, appearance, and man as social animal. Civic de-
sign as such resonates with this essay insofar as it takes the functioning of the 
city as a built environment with a particular appearance and extends it to the 
functioning of the process of democracy and peace building, which has much 
to do with cooperation. Last, Tunnard finds that the civic designer’s “approach 
and the results of his approach will actually condition the life that goes on in 
cities” (Tunnard, 1951: 143). To be sure, this essay relies on an approach that 
will “condition” the lives of people by tweaking the built environment, thereby 
promoting democracy and peace building. 
This brings me to what I see as one of the most important ways in which 
civic design can be utilized to spur on democracy and peace building: the cre-
ation of “shared objects” of positive evocativity that bind (and bridge) peo-
ple and that eventually displace the boundary markers and warning signs of 
provocation on their way to dismantling ethnic enclaves. The creation of these 
shared objects can occur in a number of ways, some more overbearing than 
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others. By commandeering the machinery of development, for example, a 
loose coalition of civic designer-developer-zoning board-landlord-neighbor 
association can prohibit certain provocative objects through zoning regulations 
and lease arrangements, thereby making it easier to turn a space into a shared 
place, a space filled-in with an object that had been off limits to some, such as 
a market. Another though less imperious way is by creating a two-way corridor 
by which peoples can cross boundaries to access gateways or entrance points, 
such as a market place and café, into another community. This could be done 
simply by making a gravel road between a small ethnic Serb enclave and the 
larger Albanian enclave more inviting by grading and smoothing it, and by 
making it well-lit. By working on the appearance and functionality of the built 
environment, the fostering of more frequent and meaningful contact between 
members of different ethnic groups would be decidedly improved. Again, these 
shared objects could be a market place, a hair salon, or a restaurant. The first 
visit of an ethnic Albanian housewife to a market place in a Serb neighborhood 
in North Mitrovica may amount to a wordless exchange with the shopkeeper, 
but over time may lead to conversations and dialogue that makes the market a 
shared object that serves as a bridge. 
Although calling a market place a shared object makes sense insofar as 
the object to which it refers has a certain physicality that allows me to point 
to it, calling it a place will capture the complexity of the market. Prior to its 
construction, there was only undifferentiated, general space at that location. At 
some point, a person or persons did what it took to “fill-in” and to particularize 
that space with a market, hence the term ‘market place’ (Geddes, 2013: 44-48). 
What was a space has now become a place with a structure possessing meaning 
and value related to peoples’ biological, social, and economic needs. Another 
way to think about this is to say that space “is that which allows movement” 
(Tuan, 1977: 6). Sometimes we pause on a sidewalk to smell the scent of some 
unseen flowering tree or to look at the beautiful sky. Each of those pauses de-
notes a place in localized space. Other times we pause before a built structure, 
for example, a market place (Tuan, 1977: 4-6). 
Although places like a market, a hair salon, and a café can instigate bound-
ary crossing, engagement, and solidarity among people with antagonistic or 
competitive identities, they are primarily business entities that engage in trans-
actions providing goods and services to customers. A pound of apples, a hair-
cut, or a cup of coffee and maybe, just maybe, the meeting of persons and not 
just customers. Yet it is the fact that each is a place of business, in the same 
location from one day to the next, which makes each an important part of peo-
ple’s everyday lives – part of the routinization of human life. 
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Of course, there are organizations whose mission includes some of those 
outcomes. Take, for example, the Nansen Dialogue Centres. The Nansen Net-
work is a non-governmental organization (NGO) that focuses on the use of 
dialogue in reconciliation and peace building, with offices in various cities 
in the Balkans. Always keen on carving out safe space and the use of com-
munication to break down enemy images and to bring people closer together, 
much of what the Network does now is centered on integrated education in 
divided schools and divided communities. Regardless, the Network has never 
utilized civic design as a way of breaking up ethnic enclaves through a frontal 
assault on provocative physical objects in the hope of transforming identities 
and relationships. 
Of course, this does not rule out the Nansen Network adding civic design 
to its mission statement and programming. However, even if the Network 
branched out in this way, it would still be “out of place” compared to the mar-
ket, hair salon, and café. To clarify this point, the Network is not like these 
businesses, which are places intimately connected with the lives of many peo-
ple. Why is this? Because the Nansen Network is an organization, and not a 
place. In fact, offices are not as important to it as are the sorts of programs 
implemented by its staff in various communities throughout the Balkans. The 
location of Nansen Sarajevo has changed over the years. Last time I was in 
Sarajevo, I called the program manager to get directions to the office. It was 
located in a place different from the one that I remembered from past years. 
But that was to be expected, given its nomadic existence as an NGO. And it is 
not as if many people need to be continuously informed of the location of its 
offices. For those who need to know, a quick glance of the Network webpage 
will suffice. The market is different, however. We do expect the market to be 
just around the corner, where it was last month and last year, because it’s vital 
to peoples’ everyday lives. And unlike the Network, most markets in the Bal-
kans are small, family businesses having no webpage. 
The approach advocated above is more about places and less about peace 
building organizations; more about physical objects and less about institutions 
and their mission statements and metrics. But there is another approach, one 
that remains oriented towards places but that requires a modest organization. 
It focuses on built structures whose sole purpose is to bring about these out-
comes, and sometimes in a not so genteel way as suggested by “spaces of 
constructive provocativity.” Take, for example, present-day Sarajevo. I can im-
agine a project, perhaps called the “Space for Creative Entanglement” (SCE), 
housed at a place along the Miljacka River, in a couple of those three-story 
Austro-Hungarian buildings on Hiesta Ulica that were severely damaged dur-
ing the 1990s war. Rather than tearing down the old and replacing it with the 
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new, preserving two war relics makes a powerful statement about the buildings 
own evocativity – as a constant reminder of Bosnia’s Habsburg era and its 
recent genocidal past, the place will use its past to help rescue Bosnia’s future. 
This “space” would be a public place where enclave maintaining objects would 
be relocated from highly visible neighborhood locations so as to constructively 
provoke through dialogue about histories, memories, and identities.46 In a way, 
the SCE would serve as a “magnet for the objectionable”. It would also be a 
place where people could create works that continue the dialogue (eventually 
leading to deliberative engagement) without eliminating dissent or opposition. 
To be sure, it would neither be a museum nor a white-walled gallery, but more 
like a studio or a laboratory. The unconventional would be valued and pro-
moted. Paintings, even over-scaled paintings; sculpture; text-and-video instal-
lations; photographs; graffiti; mixed media; and poetry would find their way 
into the SEC. But there would also be experimentation with many forms of 
expression, both indoor and outdoor (rooftop and courtyard sculpture and graf-
fiti – maybe even space for land art [à la Robert Smithson, for example]), and 
an openness to and acceptance of all sorts of themes – matters of ethnicity and 
nationalism, even trauma; issues of religion, class, gender, sexual orientation, 
climate change, and much more. 
Like the horns of the dilemma, the path between would result in a hollow-
ing out of the ethno-nationalist vibrancy of neighborhoods. Yet the livability of 
neighborhoods for all their inhabitants would be promoted through shared ob-
jects and space, which would transform identities (and maybe alternative, tran-
scendental identities) and relationships. The hope is that focusing on objects 
that provoke animosity and violence and eliminating them through self-censor-
ship and the creation of shared objects and spaces that are evocatively positive 
or that tap into the dialogical, critical, and creative capacities of people will 
collapse ethnic enclaves that hold back societal progress. And there is more: 
collapse will be achieved without compromising those parts of cultures that are 
not very antagonistic towards other cultures or that are but that are confined to 
the more private space of the dwelling. This is what also accounts for how the 
path between the horns values cultural diversity.47 
46 David Rieff (2016) is correct to note that keeping alive the memory (which would fall under 
the categories of Lederach’s [2005: 141] “lived history” and “remembered history”) of gen-
ocides and the like provides us with no immunity against future atrocities. He may even be 
partially correct in arguing that perpetuating such memories may perpetuate revenge (he cites 
the Bosnian war of the 1990s as an example). However, his treatment of history has not much 
to do with this essay’s reference to history. 
47 I am not concerned with the preservation of cultural particularity of minority groups against 
intrusions of dominant cultures within post-conflict societies as much as I am with the pres-
ervation of minority culture by way of maximizing its exposure to others. Gutmann (1994) 
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The third path is similar to Placemaking, a trendy approach to urban plan-
ning that builds communities around places (Schneekloth and Shibley, 1995). 
By recognizing and working with the physical, social, cultural, emotional, and 
spiritual qualities of places, planners and inhabitants alike can enliven neigh-
borhoods (Project for Public Spaces, PPS, 2007). Placemaking works well in 
North America and parts of Europe, but it is only an ideal for countries like 
Bosnia and Kosovo because Placemaking is a collaborative process and there 
is too much trauma, antagonism, and mistrust currently stifling that process in 
those Balkan countries. The hope is that the path that I have laid out will lead 
to something like Placemaking. 
Postscript
H1-H4, the e-matrix, and solutions presented here are tenuous and deserve 
scrutiny. Some of it will provoke fierce criticism, even hostility. Perhaps I have 
torn the envelope rather than pushed it. Whatever, no assent is required; just 
“take it in” and see what happens. It is a work of integrative philosophy, a prax-
ical assemblage of an empirically informed conceptual tapestry with many of 
its “theoretical threads” taken for granted. Such philosophy is visceral, experi-
ential, and personal. This essay was written in Grbavica (Sarajevo) and Torsted 
(Horsens) during the BREXIT summer of 2016 and in Omaha during the sum-
mer of 2017. I wish to thank my mentors John Kultgen and David A. White, as 
well as my colleagues Curtis Hutt, Jack Heidel, and Per Bauhn for reading and 
commenting on an early draft of the manuscript, and Kathy Schwartz for her 
continued editorial assistance. Finally, I am indebted to Mia Nielsen for that 
Danish summer and for her skepticism of the e-matrix that forced me to make 
sense of it. 
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A Physicalist Theory of Managing 
Impediments to Democracy and Peace 
Building in the Balkans
Abstract
The post-conflict societies of Bosnia and Kosovo continue to be plagued by 
the deleterious effects of ethno-nationalism and ethnic enclaves. Unfortunate-
ly, this mix impedes both democracy and peace building within these Balkan 
countries. One way to promote such building is for these enclaves to collapse, 
thereby allowing multiethnic societies to develop. This essay proposes that 
enclaves be dealt with physically by ridding them of those evocative objects 
that help to create and maintain enclaves. By getting physical in this way, how-
ever, we find ourselves in a dilemma, caught on the horns of legality and ex-
pediency. Yet there is a promising path between the horns that involves civic 
design. This essay offers a physicalist theory of managing these impediments 
to democracy and peace building, beginning with four hypotheses, followed by 
an abstraction and mathematization in the form of a matrix, a dilemma arising 
from these hypotheses, and possible solutions. 
Key Words: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Deliberative Democracy, 
Peace Building, Democracy Building, Deliberative Engagement, Ethno-Nati-
onalist, Evocative Objects, Evocativity Matrix, Matrix, Civic Design, Ethnic 
Enclave 
